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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY

ETHICS CENTER

Humphry and Takken
Debate California
Death Initiative
Active euthanasia was the subject of
an all-day debate sponsored by the Loma
Linda University Ethics Center during
LLU's recent Alumni Postgraduate Convention. Opposing points of view were
presented by Derek Humphry, founder
and executive director of the Hemlock
Society, and Teresa Takken, founder
and director of the Pacific Institute for
Ethics and Education in the Life Sciences. At issue was California's "Humane and Dignified Death Initiative." The
riebate was videotaped by camera crews
om the National Broadcasting
Company's news department for use in
a national television program.
The seminar began with a review of
the historical and ethical settings of the
initiative by Loma Linda University's
Gerald Winslow. Takken expressed her
reservations regarding the initiative in a
formal lecture, after which Humphry
presented a brief in its behalf. Humphry
and Takken then debated the initiative
and responded to questions from the
doctors, nurses and ethicists who had
gathered for the day's activities in the
Campus Chapel.
According to Humphry, the essence of
the instrument is that it would "enable a
patient who is dying in an unbearable
manner to request in writing that the
treating physician administer to him or
her an overdose of a lethal drug, either
orally or intravenously."
Takken, an American nun who has
served and studied in Holland for many
years, and Humphry, an English atheist
who now resides in Southern California,
differed regarding many issues. Their
disagreements were sharpest regarding
the relationships between: (1) religion
ld morality, (2) suffering and virtue, (3)
..;ausing death and allowing it, (4) individual freedom and the common good, and
(5) current practices in the United States
and policies in Holland.

LLU Schedules Clinical Ethics
Seminar for 1989
A program of intensive study in the
clinical aspects of biomedical ethics is
planned for the winter quarter of 1989 at
Loma Linda University. Known as the
Clinical Intensive in Biomedical Eth ics
(CIBE), the program is being organized
and sponsored by the School of Religion's
Department of Christian Ethics in cooperation with LLU 's School of Medicine,
the Center for Christian Bioethics, and
the Medical Center. The purpose of
CIBE is to provide an introduction to
issues of biomedical ethics within the
clinical setting.
The eight-week program is planned

for an interdisciplinary group of professionals and students of professions
whose present or anticipated responsibilities require a knowledge of, biomedical ethics. A group of eight to twelve
persons representing such fields as
medicine, nursing, allied health professions, law, philosophy, ministry, social
work, and health care administration will
be selected. Eight units of graduate
credit will be available to the participants
who desire it. For further information
write to Professor Gerald Winslow, the
program's director, at the Loma Linda
University Ethics Center.

Jack Provonsha Lectureship
Inaugurated at A.P.C.
A new series of annual lectures that
honors and extends the contributions of
Dr. Jack W. Provonsha to LLU 's School
of Medicine was inaugurated during the
1988 Alumni Postgraduate Convention .
Norman J. Woods, president of LLU,
introduced the series and Dr. Provonsha, the first lecturer, to those who
crowded into the Randall Visitors Center
on Tuesday evening, March 8. The title
of Dr. Provonsha's presentation was
"Checking the Foundations: The Moral
Presuppositions of the Practice of Medicine Revisited."
President Woods announced that the
Jack Provonsha lecturer in 1989 will be
Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, a physician and
philosopher who now serves as the director of Georgetown University's Kennedy Institute of Biomedical and Reproductive Ethics.
The purpose of the Provonsha Lectureship is to introduce to those attend-

ing the Annual Postgraduate Convention the ideas of physicians who are also
accomplished moral philosophers or
theologians. The series is co-sponsored
by LLU's Ethics Center and by the Alumni
Association of the university's School of
Medicine.
Dr. Provonsha, the physician and
philosopher for whom the series is
named, taught medical ethics and philosophy of religion with distinction at LLU
for more than a quarter of a century. He
was educated at Pacific Union College,
Loma Linda University, Harvard University and Claremont Graduate School.
Dr. Provonsha was the Ethics Center's
first director. He continues to serve as
chairman of the Center's Board of Directors even though he has "retired" in the
state of Washington to give his full time
to writing and lecturing. His wife Margaret is also a physician.

ETHICS AND OLD AGE
by Joseph Fletcher
University of Virginia
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Those who follow different drums often meet anyway,
transiently, at one point or another along their different
paths. Take, for example, the question about old age and
when we have lived long enough.
I have just read 'a new book which contends that ethically
there should be a limit on life-prolonging medical care
because there are too many people who live well beyond
the biblical "three score years and ten," and the cost of
keeping them alive unjustly deprives younger people.
In my own case I, too, have believed that there should be
a limit on the life span, but I came to it by way of biological
reasoning in the indicative mood, not as a principle of social
ethics in the imperative mood. Exploring possible ways to
prolong human lives by genetic and biochemical strategies,
I realized in the course of my investigation that our brain
cells, unlike all the other cells in our bodies, die off without
any capacity to regenerate. This being the case, whatever
means might be found to prolong human lives would have
a negative consequence. It would lead to a massive
population of senile old people.
According to classical anatomy, we are born with a given
number of brain cells. Whether they are wiped out by injury,
disease, or old age, they are finished off never to be
replaced. Tissue transplants and implants into brains,
recent innovations, do not change the facts, however
promising they may be, for tentative use therapeutically. If
and when treatments using adrenal and fetal tissue transplants become clinically feasible they might, perhaps, hold
out hope for victims of maladies such as Alzheimer and
Parkinson's disease.
The "Iongevitists" were not facing up to a serious limit
already set on living, set objectively de rerum nature, in the
nature of things-at least if the quality of life as well as its
quantity is taken into account. At the age of 40, Dr. Sam
Johnson in his Vanities of Human Wishes(1749) observed,
"Life protracted is protracted woe." In the eighteenth
century even at the age of 40 people were already faced
with the problems of health not reached in the twentieth
century until they are 60 years old. Johnson, at the
relatively early age of 40, had begun to know what a New
Hampshire farmer had in mind when he told me recently
that "old age ain't for sissies."
For all his storied brilliance Dr. Sam knew nothing of brain
physiology,'nor did he ever imagine or foresee how modern
hygiene and public health practices were going to add to
the average life span. Now in the twentieth century people
75 to 84 have increased by eleven times; those 85 and older
have increased by twenty times. Only now do people age;
they used to die. Added to the general longevity was

something else Johnson was unable to foresee-the "protracting" capabilities of modern resuscitative medicine. In
short, he had no inkling of the social and economic pressures which now amplify the personal and medical problems of living too long.
Sir George Pickering, Regius Professor of Medicine at
Oxford in the 1970s, being biologically oriented, drew the
ethical conclusion that longevity research would result in an
increased population of people with young bodies and
senescent minds; it was to him a terrifying prospect and he
considered it wrong. Imagine for yourself a new technology
that is able to provide youth for people who would fall victim
to Alzheimer's disease.
The neurologist Lord Brain argued that research into prolonging human life should not be stopped or foregone
because if we cannot foresee all of the consequences of
making new discoveries, which is true enough, then we
cannot foresee of a certainty what will be the consequences
of not making new discoveries. Brain was casting aside
any rational or prudent limits on new knowledge and knowhow. He absolutized knowledge as if it is intrinsically and
always good, always desirable, urging a kind of knownothing or blind approach to research and investigation, a
if it is good for its own sake.

"The whole thrust of his reasoning is
that we oldsters (I am myself an
octogenarian) have a moral obligation to die. "
Such a posture is impossible for those whose ethical
appraisals are carried out consequentially, that is, by
projecting the probable effects of any course of action,
weighing up the good and bad, the desirable and undesirable. Not to set limits means in effect not to have significant
values. Not to foresee the results of such a technological
innovation as induced longevity when it is foreseeably of
negative value and thereby irrational is tantamount to
rejecting any moral limits on knowledge.
The consequential method of reasoning (call it prudential
if you prefer) is the one used by Daniel Callahan in his new
volume Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society
(Simon and Schuster, 1987), already mentioned. He
foresees that resuscitation and even less crucial forms of
medical treatment can prolong the woes of old people. He
does not single out senescence as a problem. His reasoning is based on a broad range of demographic considerations, social and economic. On these grounds he appeal'
to us to recognize how negative the consequences are (
extending human lives, and expensive. He recommends
that we set limits in the quantity and duration of human lives,
for the sake of both the quality of life for the elderly and out

of distributive justice to the whole population. His rejection
of utilitarianism in theory is well known, but in practice he
shows us that nonetheless he is as consequential in his
ethical appraisal of the problem as John Stuart Mill ever
~hought of being . I find no fault with him on this score, none
r( )1t all.
Callahan has long been aware, keenly aware, of the
finiteness of human values and human goals. In The
Tyranny of Survival (1973) he made this plain, in terms that
were often too sharp to be enjoyed by simplistic futuriststhe sort who automatically applaud all innovations as such,
as Lord Brain did with his "Let's do it and then see what
happens." Tyranny was written more than fifteen years
ago and even then Callahan used population growth (and
along with it genetic innovations) as an instance of the need
to carefully count the costs. He was suggesting even then
that we set limits on medicine's technological capabilities.
His new 1987 work is rather heuristic; setting limits is
focused solely on the ethics of population growth and its
demographics. His thinking is keyed more to future conditions as he projects them than to the present.
In Tyranny he said explicitly that "limits" mean No! It
means setting boundaries beyond which we should be
forbidden to go. At the same time, however, he felt that the
rational case ethically for limiting population has little or no
chance of being accepted widely enough to have any
cultural and therefore political force , thus in effect underlining his own proposal.
Now in Setting Limits Callahan is more draconian but no
more optimistic. He foresees that to try to limit lifeextending medical care for the elderly would result not only
in a conflict of conscience but in blackmarket practices,
,~uch like what followed passage of the Eighteenth Amend)nent prohibiting alcoholic drinks. People would violate
/ both legal statutes and moral principles in order to stay
alive, just as they did to get a cocktail or highbaU. Nonetheless, he questions the notion of long life, as such, in effect
inviting us to face the question whether the old do not after
all have a moral obligation to die-for the sake of distributive justice.
Setting aside the practical difficulties as unsolvable Callahan turns to the imperative mood, to what should be,
apart from can or could be. He examines the demographics
of old age-their increasing numbers, the escalating cost of
their care and treatment, the built-in inevitable loss of
function and/or quality in their lives, as well as the fact that
supporting the old deprives the growing young of needed
funds. Perhaps the most questionable of several questionable assumptions in his book is that society will not be able
economically to provide the elderly with full medical care.
All of this poses searching ethical questions. What precisely is the moral obligation of the children or their neighbors to preserve them? On what grounds does it rest?
Such questions of moral philosophy are, alas, not examined critically in Callahan's book. Instead, he turns to social
ethics, to generalizations about the obligations of government and its fiscal policies. As he sees it, a rational study
of the problem leads to the guideline (in my words, not his)
that the public purse ought to be open to help all people of
all ages to live out a natural or normal life span, but not
oeyond that.
.) The helpable years, as he seems to see it, end when we
become septuagenarians or, if not then, when we become
octogenarians or "nonegenarians." When the cut-off point
is reached, he thinks, the elderly ought to be given comfort

care but no more treatment if it is so expensive it uses up
scarce or limited resources needed by younger people.
Callahan never says it in so many words but the whole
thrust of his reasoning is that we oldsters (I am myself an
octogenarian) have a moral obligation to die-an obligation
based on distributive justice and a cost-benefit calculation.

"Survival is a 'gut' matter; distributive justice is an abstract principle,
much weaker motivationally. "
This position is for most people a much harder one to take
than the one lying behind the right-to-die movement. The
right to choose to die rather than suffer further treatment,
especially in terminal illnesses, is implicit in the decriminalization of suicide and explicit in statute law which is on the
books in thirty-nine states of the Union and the District of
Columbia. Their position is a far cry from claiming that if
people are elderly they ought to die whether they want to or
not, as a matter of social obligation. The difference is
between saying we "may" choose death and we "ought" to
choose it.
The right-to-die movement poses a microethical problem
on a one-by-one choice basis of decision making, but what
Callahan is talking about is macroethical, on the basis of
impersonal demographic data and a sense of social justice.
It is this difference between being free as an individual to
choose to die, on the one hand, and being morally obliged
to die, on the other, which makes the demographic basis so
radical-that makes it such a wrenching break from the
conventional wisdom.
Advocates of the right-to-die will not automatically or
quickly turn into ought-to~die advocates. Far from it. Even
if they endorse it as a principle of social ethics they will fall
back from acting on it, especially in cases where the lives
of their own parents or kin are at stake. The general run of
people love being alive too much to give it up, no matter
what they may th ink logically about the "tyranny" of the wish
to survive. They may gladly give life up when the flame is
no longer worth the candle, when it's better to be dead, but
not for reasons of abstract social justice.
Survival is a "gut" matter; distributive justice is an abstract
principle, much weaker motivationally. Survival is an
instinctual demand and, indeed, the fundamental dynamic
of the evolutionary process, whereas principles of social
justice are only matters of intellectual or rational reflection.
As a question of philosophy I am convinced, as Callahan is,
that personal morality is properly spelled out within the
context of social ethics. Moreover, we (he and I) agree that
the social interest has priority over private interests-if and
when they come into tension or conflict. Hence, the principle of eminent domain in the law, for example. The case
for not extending the life of older people may be strong
cerebrally, but it is not strong "intentionally." It is therefore
without cultural or popular force.
The human gut often subverts reason . Time after time,
to wit, I have heard physicians say, "Yes, the case for
bringing a patient's life to an end when he or she wants it to
be ended, in certain situations, is logically right, but I just
'feel' that when it came right down to the wire I couldn't do
it." This lack of union between mind and feeling could well 3
have been one reason behind Oscar Wilde's assertion in
Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young (1884),
"Any preoccupation with ideas of right and wrong shows an
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arrested development"-although he would have better
said "impractical" than "arrested."
The media and popular press, not only scientific journals,
often give a fairly realistic picture of the facts about population pressure and its social ills. For our purposes here, the
following data indicate why the elderly increasingly pose an
urgent problem. We in the United States spent over $80
billion out of general and private funds on health care for the
old in 1981. By the year 2000 that is expected to be $200
billion. In the past twenty years the percentage of federal
funds, not to speak of state and local, rose from 15 percent
to 28 percent-nearly doubled. The population between 65
and 80 years of age is now greater than the population
under 18. Since the turn of this century people over 65 have
increased their numbers more than eightfold.
Those over 85 are the fastest-growing age group in
America. The age level 75-84 was eleven times greater
than it was in 1900. Life expectancy has moved up from 60
years in 1930 to 76 years in 1984. Increasing longevity
carries with it an increasing rate of chronic and acute
illnesses. Health care costs for the elderly alone were 40
percent of the federal budget for health care in 1984, and
this is expected to go up to 60 percent by the year 2024. In
the same period there are projected increases for those
over 65 of 157 percent in physician visits, 278 percent in
nursing home residents, and 159 percent in personal
health payments (in constant dollars).
Here, then, in measurement terms, is the basic picture.
As Garrett Hardin says in his Filters Against-Folly (1986),
we have to be numerate as well as literate to understand
our problems. Demography gives us plenty of reason for
concern with the old-age population. It shows us why
"going on living" can be not onlya burden for individuals and
their families but for society too. Hence, the question: Does
not medicine in particular and society as a whole have to
back off and ask whether-as the Bible puts it-there isn't
a time to plant and a time to pluck, a time to live and a time
to die? Not only in particular cases of personal choice, as
in voluntary euthanasia and the exercise of our rights under
living will laws, but in principle as a general policy.
When I put together the two points already made-(1)
that there is a general human aversion to dying even in the
"old old" (75 plus) and (2) that death is sooner or later
welcome for the sake of some individuals themselves as
well as in the common interest-the result is, I think, a sharp
turn away from Callahan's treatment of the question. I am
not antipodal altogether to his concern about the numbers
side of the question, but I want to propose that human lives
should always end, short of nature's final mandate, as a
voluntary choice and never as an imposition on unwilling
persons. Put bluntly, we should not try to deal with the
problem by allocating and limiting medical care to the
elderly.
Even to toy with the thought of doing so reveals an
inordinate scheme of values, a value system gone awry, a
distorted pondering of what we prize and value. It fails to
render our obligations to our elderly parents and neighbors
the high-order value they should have. A test of our
humanity is what we are willing to sacrifice for them. They
are disadvantaged through no fault of their own, even
though some of them might be culpable in part because of
their habits and life style.
I propose, therefore, that we drop the idea that we can or
should apply the concept of moral obligation for the category "old age." Let us apply it instead to cases. In short, we

ought to decide whether there is an obligation to die in terms
of particular individuals in particular situations, not in terms
of generalized categories of human beings.
This, of course, is the approach of situation ethics.
Situation ethics is, as Webster-Merriam defines it, a "system" of ethics "based on love '" by which acts are judge
wtthin their context instead of by categorical principles.'
When the families and physicians of our old men and
women perceive that life has become irreversibly a sore
burden for them, then out of loving concern let them "go" by
stopping treatment and withholding resuscitative measures and artificial medical life-support systems-in short,
welcome death.
Only if the patient is hopelessly incompetent and no
longer able himself to choose for or against dying should we
decide for him. This is what the courts call "substituted
judgment," and even in such cases it's still really the
patient's own choice, reasonably presumed.
Putting it bluntly, we should be case-centered, not rulecentered. Let us hope we will never adopt an undiscriminating age limit, such as the British National Health Service
once set de facto on renal dialysis for patients over 55,
although without any formally stated policy or provision in
the law. The practice ended because England's elderly
protested vigorously, as well as their friends in the younger
generations. Even the Eskimos used to let their decrepit
elderly go out of the igloo in freezing weather to die by
hypothermia, often said to be a "good way to go." This was
on a diagnostic basis, not a birthdate basis.
I can, I believe, take comfort in the knowledge that
patients and their families, like people in general, are open
more and more to giving death a welcome. I recall how old
Dr. Logan Clendendenning once remarked that the natura'
world blundered on to the form of energy called life bl!
having so blundered, if there is any creative intelligence
behind it all, death was ' "a real stroke of genius" (The
Human Body, 1941).

"Society should be willing to spend all
that is needed for the elderly's medical
needs. "
The statistic and demographic data, even in terms of a lay
grasp, is already generating changes in popular sentiment.
Out of a combination of rational self-regard and loving
concern for the sick and old, we see that families, physicians and patients themselves are pulling out of the old
outmoded notion that life is an absolute value or end in itself
and that dying is outside any human initiatives-taboo and
untouchable. Quality of life steadily transcends the absolutism of the "sanctity" of life doctrine.
We should continue to provide the funds for medical care
of the old even though it uses up resources we could have
used for other things. We should provide it as a matter of
love and loyalty, not as a "sacrifice," revising if necessary
the way we rank-order our relative values. The "squeeze"
of medical costs for the elderly which falls on younger
people will constantly be lightened by the elderly themselves, as they exercise their right to die. Our ability to
improve cost-effectiveness can help.
Americans like to think America is "the richest country i.
the world," and whether that is true or not we surely are rich
enough to keep our parents alive as long as they wish to be,
even though we may have to cut down or out not only what

is spent on luxuries but even reallocate whatever seems to
fall into the class of "needs" and desirables. The young and
the old are partners, not rivals. An age war is a paranoic
scenario.
On this principle nobody's death will come as a matter of
( 'locial-economic policy. The elderly will die voluntarily
(ather than because medical help was r~fused them. And
at the same time we can hope and even foresee that more
and more of the decrepit will choose to die out of respect for
their own quality of life.
There are very few physicians who value human lives absolutely rather than relatively. Dr. Howard Spiro of the Yale
School of Medicine recently listed some of the questions
being asked in medical circles. "What disabilities of old age
do we repair? At what cost? ... Do. we try to repair all
defects that lead to death? Only those that lead to a bad
death? ... Only recently have we begun to wonder whether
it is always prudent to do whatever can be done. How much
does society, all of us really, want to spend on the old and
sick~ That issue lies behind most of the ferment in medicine.
Just as important, how much do the old want of the
ministrations of medicine?" (The Paros, Alpha Omega
Alphas National Medical Honors Society, 51 [Winter,
1988]:19-23).
On the groundwork I have outlined, we should repair
disabilities only if the patient chooses treatment, and only
after a careful assessment has been made and interpreted
to the patient of how much promise it gives of continued
quality of life. We should be clinically realistic; physicians
should be candid with all involved, but willing to treat except
where it is patently useless. Society should be willing to
spend all that is needed for the elderly's medical needs.
The free and competent consent should be all we require
or either treating them or withholding treatment.
All this adds up to dropping any notion of setting impersonal and categorical limits on medical treatment for the
aged. It turns us instead to a policy of respect for the aged's
choice, doing all we can meanwhile to encourage a choice
of death whenever it is in the patient's own best interest. By
this route we will avoid giving what somebody recently
called a bumpersticker answer to a bubblegum question.
I think of the recent news regarding organ transplant
cutbacks in Oregon. It underlines the lack of realism in any
proposal to cut back medical treatment for the elderly.
Oregon's legislature last year voted against public assistance for heart, liver, and bone marrow transplants. Because kidney and cornea transplants are less expensive
and more successful, a majority voted for them. Statistics
showed that 400,000 of Oregon's 2.6 million peopleyoung, middle-aged, and old-had no health insurance. It
was learned that 1500 pregnant women could have prenatal care for what it would cost to pay for only 30 of the
excluded transplants. A majority of the legislature decided
that to be fair they both have to limit funds and allocate on
a need basis.
The legislative vote showed a concern for distributive
justice, the greatest good for the greatest number, but
would a majority also have favored cutting out people
because they were old-or black or born of naturalized
parents or because they had no high school diploma-or
~ny other such category of people? Of course not. In a
Jemocratic society cost-benefit analyses and success rates
are relevant in deciding whether to treat individuals in
individual situations, but not categorical discriminations.
Physicians accept the reality and inevitability of death. It

takes very little clinical experience to learn the desirability
in certain situations of stopping treatment if that is the
patient's wish, or a surrogate's. The common law has
always regarded involuntary treatment as a tort. The
courts, especially at the appellate level, constantly uphold
the right of all patients to choose to die by stopping
treatment for sufficient rational cause. Resuscitation and
medical life-support systems are being turned off every day
in our hospitals.
Facing the problems posed by a steadily increasing
population of elderly people, we will have to face the fact
that "stopping treatment" really means ending the lives of
those who exercise their right to die voluntarily. To avoid
ending the lives of senior citizens en bloc by the indirect
strategy of limiting funds for their medical care we should,
as I propose, turn to a plan of voluntary living and dying for
the old. Let me offer a description of what it will mean, not
in legal terms but in terms of basic ethical principles.
Causing people to die-whether young, middle-aged,
old, or old old-is repugnant. In the case of the elderly, if
their numbers cost the rest of us more than it used to cost,
we shall meet the problem by a new allocation of funds,
perhaps entailing a cut in other things and even a revised
definition of "need" and "luxury." As to medical costs in
particular we will not try to eliminate the elderly by indirect
maneuvers such as limiting funds for care and treatment.*
Categorical discriminations for the purpose of reducing
the numbers of the old are unethical. Patients of any age
are persons. In a genuine democracy the Kantian principle
is basic-persons are ends in themselves, not means to the
ends of others. Our social ethics allocates common resources on the principle of equal worth and our personal
resources on the principles of loving concern, loyalty, and
gratitude.
Our cultural attitude toward dying by choice becomes
more favorable all the time. Between 1973 and 1985 those
Americans who oppose euthanasia fell from 52 percent to
35 percent, according to a poll by Louis Harris and Associates; those favoring rose from 38 percent to 62 percent.
This is really active euthanasia, not passive. It does not
wait for death to come. The ethical assumption is that
patients in such straits are terminally ill, but "terminal" is a
loose word meaning hopelessly ill. The courts are still
conflicted. On one hand they uphold the principle of selfdetermination and the personal freedom to stop treatment,
but on the other hand they still disapprove euthanasia and
decry suicide, even though the latter has been granted
legal status.
Euthanasia, in actual fact, is being decriminalized as
suicide has already been. By such voluntary decisions,
such free choices, the effect is that the costs of medical
treatment are being reduced. That is the way they should
be reduced, not by picking out the elderly to be finished off
no matter what their personal health might be like-just
because they are old.
To arrange to have the elderly die because they cannot
get medical help due to a purposive lack of funds is a policy
of involuntary euthanasia. Ethically it is ignoble, just as
voluntary dying can be noble and right, depending on the
situation and without invidious distinction.
*None of this is inconsistent with the fact that triage selections
are sometimes necessary. This is a heart-breaking choice
situation due not to policy but to insufficiences of supplies which
come about for various reasons, not intended or wanted.

5

A RESPONSE TO FLETCHER
by Daniel Callahan
The Hastings Center
Joseph Fletcher has written a sensitive and thoughtful
response to my book. However, I think it simply begs the
various questions I am trying to raise, rather than responding to them.
First, Professor Fletcher seems to think that the entitlement program for the elderly should be an open-ended one,
regardless of how much that might cost, or regardless of the
burden upon other age groups. How can that possibly be
fair or reasonable, particularly if the costs really mount to
enormously high proportions? How could we offer any age
group an unlimited, infinite kind of entitlement? A recent
study by the Urban Institute in Washington indicated that
we could be looking at deficits in the present Medicare
program of well over$1 00 billion ayear, sometime between
the year 201 0 and 2020. We are already having a national
crisis over a total national deficit in the vicinity of $150
billion. How could we afford to have a deficit over $100
billion for one program alone?
Second, an entitlement program based on trying to meet
individual need and individual desire, however unlimited,
seems to me to go much too far. We simply do not know,
in the face of contemporary medicine, how to find a fixed
notion of what individuals need-the standards constantly
escalate, driven by social desire, technological possibility,
and the availability of funding. There is no such thing as a
fixed need, but it is subject to social construction and social
variability. To say, then, that we must meet all needs of the
elderly is to simply pledge ourselves to a kind of demand
that would be unfair to meet, and that we would grant to no
other age group.
Third, it seems to me to introduce an enormous confusion
into our public debate to talk about a limitation of an entitlement program as "involuntary euthanasia." By that standard, all of those who live now between the ages of 1 and
64, who have no entitlement program at all, are being subjected to "involuntary euthanasia" when they lack medical
resources. For a society that is increasingly going to have
to set medical limits, it would create an enormous muddle
to call every decision to set a limit-or to engage in triage-
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as involuntary euthanasia, or euthanasia of any kind.
Would that include the legislator who decided that it was
more important to vote, say, for housing rather than health
care? That kind of decision happens all the time, and no
one has ever thought of calling it a form of euthanasia.

------------------------~(~
"How could we offer any age group
an infinite kind of entitlement?"

What I am proposing for the very distant future-20-30
years from now-cannot be very happy, and could not
possibly be ideal (though I do believe that our quest for
endless life-extension for the elderly and all other groups is
not good for them in any case). We are going to have to
draw lines somewhere, and we are going to have to make
certain that one age group-which will fairly soon be my
own-is not allowed to take the funds needed by other age
groups. We should all be prepared to make sacrifices for
each other, but the aged are in a historically unique situation-they are on the frontier of an endless medical
horizon, where we could simply spend more and more
money, but not necessarily improve human life, and do so
at the expense of the needs of other age groups, and the
rest of society more generally.

HOW OLD IS TOO OLD?
by David Larson
Lorna Linda University
When it comes to qualifying for a transplanted organ ~
any other expensive medical resource, how old is too old,
One plausible answer is that a patient is too old for an
expensive medical resource whenever it probably cannot
extend his or her own autobiography for an additional year
or so. Patients and their families should be free to purchase
with their own funds any therapy they desire providing this
liberty does not unfairly affect other recipients. But society
does not seem to possess a moral obligation to finance all
such therapies through governmental programs.
Efficiency and Morality
Some doubt that health professionals should highlight a
patient's age when allocating expensive medical resources.
Their concerns are not wholly misplaced. Our society often
values the young more than the old in ethically capricious
ways. Age can also be a medically arbitrary standard, as
evidenced by the greater willingness of some surgeons to
transplant organs into older patients now that these physicians themselves are older. Using age as a criterion can
even deteriorate into a mindless process that allows doctors and others to make difficult decisions without wrestling
with the complexities of each situation on a case by case
basis.
But one important argument in favor of considering age
when allocating expensive medical resources is that it is
often inefficient and therefore immoral not to do so. According to basic economic thought, any distribution is efficie r
if it cannot be changed so as to enable one individual \....
receive more without thereby causing another to receive
less. To divide an apple pie, for instance, so that some

receive more than they can eat and therefore others
receive less than they desire is inefficient even if no one
goes without.
Such inefficiency may be unpleasant when hosts allo~ate apple pie. It is unethical when professionals allocate
;hedical resources because it is one thing to cause a guest
'to forego dessert and another thing to cause a patient to
forfeit life. This happens when a patient dies because an
expensive medical resource was wasted upon another
patient who was too old to benefit from it. The immorality
of such inefficiency is evident by the fact that we would not
choose to die so that a life-saving resource could be
squandered on someone who could not benefit from it. "Do
unto others," the Golden Rule declares, "as you would have
them do unto you."
Chronological Age and Medical Age
Many objections to highlighting age evaporate when it is
stipulated that medical age matters more than chronological age. One way to distinguish the two is to specify that
chronological age is retrospective and focused and medical age is prospective and comprehensive. To determine
a patient's chronological age, one counts backward as
accurately as possible to his or her birth in a tally of elapsed
time. To determine a patient's medical age, one counts
forward as accurately as possible to his or her death taking
all factors into consideration. Twins, for instance, can
exhibit similar chronological ages but very different medical
ages.

"The moral purpose of medicine is to
" nable patients to extend and enrich
,the stories of their own lives. "
It is more difficult by far in many circumstances to
calculate medical age than chronological age as these
terms are used here. This difficulty is one reason why
Daniel Callahan, The Hastings Center's director, rejects
medical age, as presently defined, as an appropriate standard. Callahan rightly discerns how medically difficult and
morally vexing such case-by-case forecasts can be.
The ethically decisive factor, however, is not how long an
individual has lived but how long he or she can be expected
to live as a person . A patient's temporal nearness to his or
her birth is of medical and moral interest only as it relates,
along with other factors, to the temporal nearness of his or
her death. If all other factors are about equal, and if both
twins cannot be served, the expensive medical resource
should be provided to the sibling who is younger medically
even though they are virtually the same age chronologically. If the difference in their medical ages is great, it would
be inefficient and therefore wrong to do otherwise.
Biological Life and Autobiographical Life
It is also inefficient and therefore immoral to bestow
costly medical resources upon a patient whose subsequent
quantity and quality of life will be meaningless to him or her.
The difference between biological life and autobiographical
) fe is the difference between the capacity to breathe and
, 'circulate one's own blood and the capacity to think and to
choose as well. The moral purpose of medicine is to enable
patients to extend and enrich the stories of their own lives

by enabling them to think and to choose for themselves.
Whenever a patient is so old medically that there is no
realistic hope of lengthening his or her own autobiography
significantly, taxpayers have no moral obligation to finance
expensive medical interventions.

"It is not necessary that the final
chapter in the patient's own story
of his or her life be 'happy;' it is
essential that it somehow makes a
difference in his or her own autobiography_ "
It is not necessary that the final chapter in the patient's
own story of his or her life be "happy," "fun," "free of pain,"
or "productive" and "useful." But it is essential that the
patient's additional time matters to him or her, that it
somehow makes a difference in his or her own autobiography. The burden of proof rests with those who doubt that
an expensive medical resource can benefit a particular
patient in this way. This requirement can be met, however.
When it is, medicine should attempt to provide comfort and
nothing more.
How long must the additional chapter in the patient's
autobiography be in order to merit the costly medical
measures that enable it? Every answer to this question is
a guess. Few would doubt the folly of spending a fortune
in order to enable a patient to live another day. And few
would doubt the wisdom of spending a dime in order to
enable him or her to live another decade. The suggestion
that society is obliged to finance expensive medical measures only if they extend a patient's autobiographical life
another year or so is a frank and clumsy compromise
between such extremes. There is nothing fixed about this
compromise except the intent to strike in a public wayan
appropriate balance between medical costs and benefits
from the patient's own point of view.
It is always necessary for members of society to care. It
is not always mandatory that they finance cures through
governmental programs. Indeed, it can be inefficient and
therefore unethical for society to do so whenever a patient
is medically so old, whatever his or her chronological age,
that an expensive therapeutic resource cannot lengthen his
or her autobiographical life for at least another year or so.
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BOOK REVIEW

Metaphors and Medicine

(

By Gerald R. Winslow
Those familiar with works in biomedical ethics might be surprised by William
May's work, The Physician's Covenant:
Images of the Healer in Medical Ethics
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983).
The reader does not find the usual list of
rules and principles applied to the usual
list of moral dilemmas. Instead, he finds
a rich exercise in moral imagination.
By examining principal metaphors that
tend to shape understandings of the
physician's professional role, May hopes
to offer a "corrective vision" of the practice of medicine. The result is a wonderfully readable and informative book.
One by one, May takes up the metaphors for the physician that "pervade our
ordinary behavior and speech." Such
metaphors are not mere decorations of
language; they have the power to affect
moral perception. They structure the
"basic script" with which people act out
their lives. Moral rules or principles may
provide guidance in unusual circumstances, but basic metaphors give a far
more "comprehensive ordering of life."
The images that May finds less than
adequate are the physician as "parent,"
"fighter," "technician," and "contractor."
These metaphors are not mere foils to be
discarded in favor of the images that are
deemed superior: the physician as "faithful covenant keeper" and as "teacher."
Each of the inferior images, however,
though it may somewhat distort moral
vision, still highlights important moral
realities.
For example, the physician as "parent"-the traditionally dominant image
of the healing role-may support the
overriding of competent patients' decisions and thus deteriorate into harmful
paternalism. Still, at its best, the parental
image is useful. Like a good parent, the
good healer exhibits compassion, nurture, and care.

At the heart of May's own vision for
medicine is his argument for the superiority of a covenantal ethic. Although he
acknowledges that his model of covenant has many roots, including the Hippocratic tradition, it draws most heavily
on biblical imagery. The Bible includes
many types of covenants, but all of these
are secondary to that "singular covenant
which embraces all others, the covenant
of the people with God."
The biblical model of covenant has
three main features: (1) the giving and
receiving of a gift that precedes (2) the
exchange of promises of fidelity, and (3)
the acceptance of a set of distinctive

"Medicine as covenant fidelity faces stiff competition
from an upstart-the physician as producer ofgoods. "
moral obligations. So God delivered the
people from Egypt (the gift); vows of
fidelity were exchanged at Sinai (the
promises); finally, the people accepted
the ritual and moral obligations that were
to govern their lives (the commands).
May applies this model to the work of
the physician. The physician's covenant
with his or her patients and the larger
community stems, first of all, from the
receipt of gifts. The physician has received his or her medical education from
the community. What is more, the physician is indebted to those patients who
have served as "teaching material."
Finally, the physician is indebted to all of
his or her patients because they provide
the opportunity to practice medicine. So
the physician is first beneficiary, then
benefactor. And in the resultant covenantal ethic, the physician responds to
the fact that he or she has already been
the recipient of gracious gifts.
May's vision is, to be sure, "correc-
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tive." It is tempting to wonder about the
prospects of theconvenantal metaphor
in our transient, secular, impersonal, and
pluralistic society. A corrective vision, I
suppose, must imagine the world the
way it should be. But does the image of
covenant faithfulness ask us to long for a
world that used to be but will not returna close-knit, communal world of people
who belonged to each other? Is the
seemingly nostalgic image of covenant
suitable in a society of strangers? How
much help does it provide in resolving,
for example, the very difficult questions
of social justice occasioned by the
enormous benefits and burdens of

modern medicine as they are allocated
by a complex society? If metaphors
have power not only to disclose but also
to obscure morally significant features of
human existence, what might the meta!
phor of covenant hide?
It seems clear that medicine as covenant fidelity faces stiff competition from
an upstart-a metaphor not discussed
by May that now bids fare to dominate
American medicine: the physician as
producer of goods for the health care
"industry." More than a single metaphor,
this is an entire system. In it, health care
is a product to be marketed. Keyexpressions include "market driven," "market
share," "case mix," and, of course, the
"bottom line." Only a little historical reflection would enable us to realize how
different this representation of medicine
is from what was once called the "ministry of healing." Given this new industrial,
big-corporation image for medicine,
maybe the metaphor and reality of covenant is worthy of reconsideration.
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